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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the role of cooperation between firms through a model of growth and social 
capital. In a growth model à la Solow we incorporate the set of resources that a relational network has at its 
disposals, as a distinct production factor, and thus examine its dissemination through evolutionary type processes in 
firm interactions. Dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that cooperation is able to increase the productivity 
of factors, fostering a higher rate of growth in the long term. The most significant result is that scarcity of social 
capital can produce a general collapse of the economic system in areas in which long term growth is usually sustained 
by the learning by doing and spillover of knowledge phenomena. This conclusion leads to reconsider the role of local 
development economic policies that should concentrate on activities that promote repeated interaction between 
firms proven to be cooperative or that encourage the formation of technological consortia. 
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Growth and social capital: an evolutionary model  
 
1. Introduction 
The promotion of efficient social and institutional structures facilitates an exchange of knowledge and skills 
that in turn promotes cooperation between economic actors (North, 1990). An efficient network of relations 
between production units may, in fact, create momentum for the productive sector and improve the performance of 
firms within it with respect to those outside of it. The amount of additional resources provided by the relational 
network identifies the social capital that is able to promote the dissemination of trust and cooperation between 
economic agents.  
A concept spreading in more recent literature is that the study of the growth of an economic system must also 
take into consideration social capital as a separate production factor, together with physical, human and technological 
capital. 
An example of this new approach can be found in Chou [2006] who includes social capital in the growth 
model à la Lucas. This acts on growth through accumulation of human capital, financial development and the 
dissemination of new technologies. Conversely, Antoci-Sacco-Vanin [2007] and Francois-Zabojnik [2006] develop 
evolutionary models to explain the dynamics of social capital and trust. However, the conclusions drawn in the latter 
two studies are discordant: while in Francois-Zabojnik’s study capital has positive effects on growth, in Antoci-
Sacco-Vanin’s it provokes a reduction, inasmuch as it subtracts resources from private consumption, even if 
equilibrium with a high level of social capital is Pareto-dominant. 
In our contribution we propose an implementation of the approaches just mentioned, by merging the 
traditional growth analysis with the study of the dynamics of cooperation. To achieve this we incorporate the 
fundamental elements of the Solow growth model in a context of strategic interaction between firms based on a 
game of coordination1. Each firm belonging to the network system can adopt cooperative or non-cooperative 
strategies; the strategic approach that on average ensures the best outcome tends to be adopted (imitated) by a 
growing number of firms. Each disposes the same social capital that is however only usable in mutual collaboration 
with another firm of the system. 
The model therefore integrates elements from the sociological approach (Bordieu [1986]), which interprets 
social capital as a phenomenon that springs from collective cooperation (actual social capital), with aspects of North’s 
[1990] institutionalist theory, according to which (potential) social capital is the set of institutions and rules of an 
economic system. 
The model, while maintaining the basic growth structure à la Solow is developed in two different versions. In 
the first, a traditional sector with diminishing returns of physical capital is considered. The model has two possible 
                                                 
1 We selected the Solow model because it is the most appropriate to focus attention on the role of firm cooperative strategies in 
a context of interaction, omitting considerations on aspects related to intertemporal consumption, human capital etc.. 
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equilibria in the long term, both characterized by nil per capita growth rates but with different levels of cooperation. 
Given that the latter allows using the additional social capital factor, the equilibrium in which it is more widespread 
dominates the other in a Paretian sense; convergence towards Pareto-dominated equilibrium is not excluded, which 
occurs when the level of cooperation is below a threshold value.  
The second version hypothesizes the existence of learning by doing and spillover knowledge processes, hypotheses 
that are particularly plausible if the subject of the study is a system of firms that share resources and information due 
to their geographical proximity and affinity of production activities. In this case, the model is able to generate 
constant returns of physical capital and therefore long-term endogenous growth1. In this second variant an 
unexpected fact emerges: the economic system, although having long term growth potential, may find itself in a 
'poverty trap’ and experience a general collapse with the annulment of output and disintegration of the network of 
firms when the levels of potential social capital and cooperation are not sufficiently high. This is a significant 
consequence that grants social capital and cooperation a leading role in sustaining the more advanced productive 
sectors where the roles played by learning processes and dissemination of knowledge are key. 
In conclusion, the models developed demonstrate that a traditional production system can continue to exist in 
a steady-state with low levels of social capital and cooperation, while the most technologically advanced sectors 
consider these factors as indispensable to their survival. 
 
 
2. A model of growth and social capital 
Let us assume that the economic system is composed of a set of production units, each of which can achieve 
output by acting individually or sharing resources with another production unit (cooperative strategy). This is a 
strategy based on the trust of the other economic agent with whom interaction is invoked. If cooperation is 
reciprocal, output by each will be greater than that which can be obtained by acting individually. The greater output 
is essentially due to an additional production factor that we define as social capital 0sK ≥ , whose level depends on 
the quality of the firm’s institutional, cultural and technological fabric. 
However, two levels of social capital exist: potential social capital, distributed evenly between firms, which 
expresses all the resources available to the network, and actual social capital, which is that actually used in production 
processes through cooperation. 
The potential social capital will thus equal sK n , the actual capital sK nx  with n  as the number of firms 
present in a local network and x the part of the potential social capital transformed into actual capital, or rather, the 
share of firms that agree to cooperate ( 0 1x≤ ≤ ).  Even if the system can potentially use a level of actual social 
capital equal to sK n  only a fraction x  of it is active i.e. used in the production process. 
                                                 
1 From literature emerges (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) that the absence of diminishing returns of capital allows obtaining 
endogenous growth. 
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The amount (1 )sK n x−  thus remains unexpressed as a result of a share (1 )x−  of non-cooperative firms. Non-
cooperation produces a social cost that is quantifiable in the amount of unused social resources.  
The population of economic agents can thus be divided into two sub-populations based on the type of 
strategic behavior adopted. This is a typical game of coordination, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
21 / GG  Cooperative Non-cooperative 
Cooperative 
11; yy  2;0 y  
Non-cooperative 0;2y  22 ; yy  
     
                                                   Table 1. Game of coordination 
 
In this context the payoff of the game represents the output of the firm itself obtained through a function of  
production: 1 1 1( , )y y A k=  and 2 2 2( , )y y A k=  are, respectively, the production functions of cooperative and non-
cooperative firms, in which 1 2 sA A K= + , 1 2  y y= if 0sK =  and 1 2 0y y= =  if 0k = , while 2A  is the 
exogenous level of technology. Thus, by construction 1 2y y> . 
The physical capital is essential to production while the social capital simply improves productivity. In the 
absence of social capital, the cooperative strategy is weakly dominated by the individualistic strategy. By calculating 
the game’s average payoff equal to 2 1 2(1 )my x y x y= + − , the dynamic equation of physical capital available in each 
single firm can be written as: 
 
(1)                                                 ( )( ) kyxyxsk δ−−+= 212 1&  
 
with s  as the share of output invested in the production processes, δ the rate of depreciation of the physical capital 
and x  the share of cooperative firms. To (1) the dynamic equation of the share of the cooperative population is 
added, based on replicator logic (for further information see Weibull (1998)). Indicating the cooperative firm’s 
expected payoff with 1 1xyΠ =  and the average payoff of the entire system with 2 1 2 (1 )av x y y xΠ = + − , the 
replicator equation is  { }1 avx x= Π −Π&  which, following some simple steps, becomes: 
 
(2) { }1 2(1 )x x x xy y= − −&  
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Variations in the increase of value x  entail increases in the social capital, in the sense that the full use of the 
local firm network’s potentiality (hereinafter referred to as the local system), defined by sK , spreads to a growing 
number of production units, with positive effects on the accumulation of physical capital and growth of output. 
In the following sections we proceed with the study of the dynamic system described with equations (1) and (2), first 
hypothesizing diminishing returns and then constant returns of physical capital. 
 
 
2.1 A model with diminishing returns of physical capital 
Let us hypothesize that capital returns are diminishing, or rather, that: 
 
 0iy
k
∂ >∂  e 
2
2 0
iy
k
∂ <∂  ( 1, 2i = ) 
 
We further assume that the Inada conditions holds and that the production factors are first-degree homogenous in 
iA  and k . We also assume that: 
 1 2
1 2
y yk k
k y k y
∂ ∂=∂ ∂   k∀  
 
With these assumptions, it is possible to demonstrate (Proposition 1) that, as in Solow’s model, diminishing 
returns of capital determine conditioned convergence and a gradual reduction of output increments. In the long 
term, very different transition dynamics accompany the reduction of capital growth rates, according to the initial 
state. Therefore, local systems with identical technological-institutional characteristics but with different levels of 
cooperation can converge towards totally different states, highlighting in time a gap of wealth produced and capital 
accumulated that can persist or deteriorate when not intervening with targeted economic policies. 
 
Proposition 1: the system described in equations (1) and (2) has the following stationary points in space ( ,x k ): 
1. ( 0,  x k k= = ( ) locally stable; 
2. ( )kkx ˆ,1 ==  locally stable; 
3. 2 2
1 1
,  =y yx k k
y y
  =     
%   saddle point, where ( )xk~  is a convex function with 0~ >∂∂ xk  if 12 2yyx >  and 
0~ <∂∂ xk  if 12 20 yyx << . 
4. ( 0 1,  0x k≤ ≤ = ) unstable. 
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Furthermore, if 1
2
yx
y
<  , the system converges towards the attractor ( 0, k( ); if 1
2
yx
y
>  , the system converges 
towards the attractor ( ˆ1,  k ).  Proof (see Appendix A)  
 
With diminishing returns of physical capital the long term growth rate is zero since the system converges to one of 
the two stationary points ( 0,  k
(
) and ( ˆ1,  k ) in which 0x k= =&&  (see figure 1). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Phase diagram in the case of diminishing returns of physical capital 
 
Preempting topics we discuss further on, we consider it opportune to emphasize at this point that economic policy 
interventions are generally designed to reduce parameter δ  or increase share s  of reinvested output through 
traditional fiscal policy levers. These measures are not decisive, precisely on account of the presence of social capital. 
They in fact create an upwards shift of function ( )xk~  without determining significant effects on long-term trends. 
The trajectories continue to converge towards the same level of social participation even if, in its new steady-state, 
the level of physical capital is now higher.  
On the other hand, if it is true that technological innovation facilitates an increase in the levels of steady-state capital, 
allowing longer economic growth, under certain conditions it produces a secondary effect, this time negative, on the 
dynamics of cooperation. In fact, if output elasticity with respect to technological progress is such that: 
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then  
2
1
2
0
y
y
A
 ∂    >∂  , or rather, an increase in the level of technology would cause a shift towards the right of the line 
0x =& , thus increasing the basin of attraction of the fixed point ( 0,  k( ) that is Pareto dominated. The fact is that 
technological improvements produce output increments for all firms, even for non-cooperative ones, and nothing 
precludes that the effect (in terms of elasticity) is greatest precisely for the non-cooperative firms. 
 
 
2.2 The model with constant returns of physical capital, learning by doing and 
spillover of knowledge 
In this second version of the model we assume that the investment activity of a firm generates types of 
positive externalities in relation to others: a firm increasing its physical capital simultaneously learns to use the 
technology available in a more efficient way (learning by doing); this capability tends to also spread to all other firms in 
the economy (spillover of knowledge). As is well known, the processes described above allow to counter the 
diminishing returns of physical capital and to generate long-term endogenous growth.  
The production function of the generic firm therefore becomes ( , )i i iy y A K k=  with K nk= , where n  is 
the number of production units in the network. As is usual in learning by doing growth models, we have 0iy
k
∂ >∂ , and 
2
2 0
iy
k
∂ <∂ , considering K constant. 
In practice, the individual firm’s capital return is diminishing while the average product of capital is constant; 
in fact, from the first-degree homogeneity of the production function we obtain  ( )i i i
y y A n
k
= . As concerns the 
cooperative population dynamic, (2) does not undergo changes.  
Instead, the physical capital dynamic and the share of cooperative firms change, which the following 
proposition defines precisely: 
 
Proposition 2: From the capital equation (1), we obtain: 
 
 2 1 20 0 (1 ) 0y yk k s x x
k k
δ  = ⇔ = ∨ + − − =    
&  
where ii
yy
k
=  implies: 0k =&  if 2
1
1
2
yx
y
 = ± ∆  with  1
2 2
1 4 1y
y sy
δ ∆ = − −   . 
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We conclude that: 
1. if 0∆ <  then 0k >&  [ ]0,1x∀ ∈ ; 
2. if 0∆ =  then: 0k =&  if 2
12
yx
y
= ; 0k >&  if 2
12
yx
y
≠ ; 
3. if 0∆ >  then,  given that 2
1
1
2
yx
y
 = ± ∆  , we have three cases: 
? if 0 1< ∆ < , 22 1
1
0 1yx x
y
< < < <  and 0k <&  if 2 1x x x< < ; 
? if 1∆ = ,  02 =x , 21
1
yx
y
=  and 0k <&  if 
1
2
y
y
x < ; 
? if 1∆ >  and 1y s
δ> , 2 1
1
1y x
y
< <  and 2 0x <  from which 0k <&  if 2x x<  and 0k >&  if 1 1x x< ≤ . 
Proof (see Appendix B) 
 
On the basis of that established with Propositions 1 and 2, we represent the dynamics of the system in the two 
relevant cases, or rather, with 0 1< ∆ <  and 1∆ > . In the long-term average product my  and capital tend to grow 
at the same rate. By limiting the analysis to the cases where 0x =  and 1x = , and taking into account that the rate 
of growth of the average product is equal to 
2 ' '
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
(2 ) ( (1 ) )
(1 )
m
m
y x xy y k x y x y
y x y x y
− + + −= + −
&& &
 , from Proposition 2 we 
obtain: 
δ
δ
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if 0 1< ∆ < ; 
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x
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m
x
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if 1∆ >  and 1y s
δ> ; 
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where 'iy  is the marginal productivity of physical capital at social level (
'
i iy y= ). Dividing by k  and given that 
' '
1 2y y>  we obtain 
1 0
m m
m mx x
y y
y y= =
   >      
& &
. 
In the first case referred to in point 3 ( 0 1< ∆ < ) the dynamics of transition may converge on two different states of 
endogenous growth, one Pareto-dominant with maximum levels of cooperation, the other with the absence of 
cooperation (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Phase diagram in the case of constant returns of capital and  10 <∆< . 
 
The transition dynamics are absent if the initial level of cooperation is 2
1
yx
y
= . In this case, the economy would 
immediately grow at a constant rate '2
m
m
yk sy
k y
δ= = −& & . The possibility of a general collapse of the system is not 
excluded with 0k →  when the trajectory finds itself at the basin of attraction of fixed points ( ,0)x  with 
2 1x x x< < . The risk of a collapse of the economy is of a much more relevant nature if 1∆ >  (see Figure 3) 
 
 
k 
x 
1
1
2
y
y  2x  1x  
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.  
 
Fig. 3. Phase diagram in the case of constant returns of capital and  1∆> . 
 
Low levels of cooperation 2
1
0 yx
y
 < <  
 compromise the possibility of future growth of the system 
irrespective of the level of accumulated capital up to such time, while for 2 1
1
y x x
y
< <  only a sufficiently high level 
of capital ensures endogenous long-term growth. The latter option induces us to sustain that growing local 
economies, and therefore with low levels of physical capital, in a context in which 1∆ > , should be able to count on 
widespread cooperation between firms and hope to grow in the future. As in all growth models, the technological 
innovation element, consisting in a rise in parameter 2A , is the system’s driving force that allows exiting from the 
‘poverty trap’. Let us suppose that 1∆ > , 2
1
yx
y
<  and 0k > ; Proposition 2 indicates that the system is in a poverty 
trap, with continuously diminishing levels of cooperation, capital and output. An increase of the technological 
progress would produce a reduction of ∆ ; if the latter were to become negative (or less than the unit), the system 
would regain growth, even if the long-term growth rate would be lower than the maximum expressible by the 
economy. Technological improvements, in fact, allow eliminating the danger of the poverty trap but do not 
condition the cooperation dynamic, which would therefore, even after the increase of parameter 2A , continue to fall. 
The possibility that technological progress can produce perverse effects on the spread of cooperation remains valid, 
as mentioned previously in the case of diminishing returns. 
0=x&  
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x 
1
1
2
y
y  1x  
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We hypothesize an economic system in which 2 1
1
y x x
y
< < , and k  is sufficiently high; in Proposition 2, 
cooperation would tend to spread to all businesses and capital would tend to grow.  In such a situation, it could be 
that even after an increase of 2A , we continue obtaining 1∆ > .  
At this point, the only effect produced by rising technological progress is a shift to the right of the 0x =&  line 
with the risk that 2
1
yx
y
<  will occur. If this were the case the economy, which was previously in growth, would now 
be in the area of the poverty trap. The phenomenon just described is more relevant the higher the 
s
δ
 ratio is. 
Also in this case, increases in the potential social capital can be decisive, inasmuch as: 
? if 1∆ > , it allows the system to exit the poverty trap, shifting the 2
1
yx
y
=  line towards the left:    
? if 0 1< ∆ < , it consents a genuine change in the system by converging ∆  to negative values. In 
Proposition 2, if 0∆ <  then the economy will grow regardless of the value, however positive, of 
physical capital and cooperation. 
Unlike technological progress, social capital can condition the dynamics of cooperation and guarantee the 
highest rates of growth that the system can express in the long-term. These considerations remain fully valid if we 
generalize the model by considering simpler production functions of the AK  type (see paragraph 3.2). 
 
 
3. Economic policy implications 
In a context where social capital has an effect on the productivity of the system, it is no longer sufficient to 
relaunch the economy of a local system through 'only' a technological/qualitative reconversion of processes and 
products or by opening up international markets; such intervention may worsen the situation if not properly 
supported by policies that encourage firms towards cooperation and to improve the functioning of local institutions.; 
in practice, policies that directly or indirectly increase the level of the potential social capital. Acting directly on the 
levels of potential social capital through institutional reforms and legislation may however be protracted and costly. 
It is therefore advisable to encourage cooperation through interventions that allow firms to better exploit the 
available relational resources, favoring the repetition of cooperation relations through their involvement in long-term 
projects requiring the sequential development of basic and applicative research, or promoting the formation of 
multiple relations through the creation of technological consortia. This type of intervention allows increasing the 
share of cooperative firms, facilitating the convergence of the system towards Pareto-dominant equilibria.  
This consideration propels us to carefully evaluate the nature of economic policy interventions. We certainly 
need to promote technological innovation but it is essential to take measures to encourage cooperation at the same 
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time. On the basis of the model developed, cooperation can grow if action is taken on the allocation of the potential 
social capital sK , or by directly creating a favorable social climate and institutional environment for firms or by 
indirectly organizing the network of firms in order to allow cooperative firms the continued use of the potential 
capital they have at their disposal. In the latter case, the sK  provision remains unchanged but the firm has the 
opportunity to repeatedly employ it in the production process. 
It is with such interventions, mainly of a qualitative nature, that cooperation becomes a winning strategy, 
stimulating non-cooperative firms to adopt it and giving a notable boost to the economic growth of the system, since 
firm performances improves the more widespread cooperation is. 
Unlike physical capital, social capital does not wear down with use: indeed, it is through use that its 
consistency increases; its deterioration is linked to non-use. In our model, the accumulation of social capital is 
through the transformation from the potential to the actual, which is only possible if a growing number of firms 
decide to use it through cooperation. Without cooperative behaviors, the relational potentiality of the system remains 
unused and the actual capital accumulated up to that time begins to diminish. 
In the following subsections we examine two possible measures which are able to sustain the spread of 
cooperation and long-term growth:  
1. encourage repeated interactions between firms having proved cooperative, promoting long-term projects 
that are able to involve them; 
2. promote the formation of technological consortia (Baumol, 2001) that allow cooperative firms to use the 
relational resources at their disposal in several simultaneous transactions. In developing this latter point, we make 
recourse to a generalization of the model mentioned in the previous section, using AK  type production functions. 
 
 
3.1 Repeated interactions and cooperation 
We hypothesized that each cooperative firm repeats the game with other cooperative firms. This means that 
if it interacts with a non-cooperative firm it will immediately discover its defection and will interrupt the game in the 
first round. Repeated interactions between two cooperative firms can come to an end with probability p . We 
indicate with m  the number of repetitions of the game before the relation is definitively discontinued. We can thus 
write 1( ) (1 )kpr m k p p −= = − , i.e. m  is a random variable with geometric distribution and the expected value 
( ) 1/E m p= . With each repetition of the game, cooperative firms can reuse the potential social capital provision; 
the average potential resources used are therefore equal to /sK p , and the production function, in the case of 
mutual cooperation, becomes 1 2( , )s
Ky A k
p
= + . It is immediately evident that the reduction of the probability of 
discontinuation of cooperative relations improves the performances of cooperative firms, encouraging the 
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dissemination of cooperation. With reference to figures 2 and 3, the reduction of p generates a shift towards the left 
of the line  0x =&  reducing the risk of convergence towards Pareto-dominated equilibria. 
We need to now understand what the institutional intervention (among others, regional authorities, meta-
management institutions and universities) must consist of in order to exploit the system’s potential. We believe that an 
important method of promoting the recurrence of relations between firms is based on the promotion of long-term 
research projects that involve firms for more than one round of the game. One way to achieve this result is to 
encourage an active role of universities, which typically perform an activity requiring long-term interaction between 
subjects. Firms (with the exception perhaps of large firms) usually do not undertake basic research activities on their 
own, since by definition this has no immediate economic return. Universities can play an important role by making 
their competences available and involving local firms. Universities can not only bring knowledge to firms of the state 
of progress of research in a particular field, but also propose agreements for the transference of basic research on a 
level of application. 
If research is designed to reach higher levels of technology and to introduce new products, then close 
cooperation between firms is necessary, especially since the finished product will require the development of a large 
number of complementary activities difficult to organize in a single firm. The initial input provided by universities is 
the propulsion for the development of cooperation between firms, which, once these are mutually recognized as 
cooperative firms, will spontaneously carry the successive phases of the process forward. This may occur, for 
example, with the promotion of a common brand that only firms following a common path can take advantage of . 
 
 
3.2 Multiple interactions and technological consortia 
The actualization of economic policies aimed at local economic growth through the promotion of active 
cooperation between firms in the exchange of information, technologies and advanced research is complex and 
protracted. This concerns acting on structural aspects of the local economy and on consolidated behavioral models, 
in a context where cooperation is probably a dominated strategy.  According to Baumol’s (2001) proposal, the 
formation of technological consortia is much more suited to organizational models characterized by small firms. This 
form of association in fact not only allows individual firms access to technology developed by other members in 
exchange for their own, or via payment of royalties, but also provides a valid incentive to conduct R&D activities in 
order to obtain goods to exchange. These agreements are concluded separately with each (or even only some) of the 
other members of the consortium and can therefore also take different forms with very different contents.  
Baumol, having proposed some significant examples of technological consortia, underlined how mutual 
exchange of technology permits the spread of knowledge within an economic system, with a clear benefit to social 
welfare. 
In a technological consortium, the technology and knowledge are the currency of exchange to obtain other 
knowledge and allow innovative/cooperative firms to obtain a profit from their innovative efforts in the form of 
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faster and cheaper access to technology and innovations developed by others. In a local system organized in 
consortia, cooperation becomes the predominant strategy and tends to spread to all firms, enabling them to exploit 
the potential social capital they have at their disposal. 
Referring back the growth model suggested earlier, we integrate this with the hypothesis of the existence of 
technological consortia assuming that each cooperative firm simultaneously interacts with n  firms. With each of 
these, it establishes a bilateral exchange of information and technology: the exchange is only profitable if it takes 
place with another cooperative firm (in accordance with the game’s schema in figure 2). Non-cooperative firms do 
not activate any consortia but can take part in it if involved by a cooperative firm.  
The schema in Figure 4 clarifies the concept of the network of consortia created by the initiatives of 
cooperative firms. In the example, each cooperative firm has activated links with another three firms in the system 
that it is part of, while non-cooperative firms are involved only in one interaction, which may be within the 
consortium or external to it. 
 
Fig. 4. Network of technological consortia between firms in the same economy and 3n=  
 
The accumulation of social capital is conducted through the search for profitable exchange opportunities. The 
formation of technological consortia increases the probability of success, encouraging the spread of cooperative 
attitudes among firms. A similar idea, even if developed in a much more complex formal framework than this, is 
referred to in Vega-Redondo (2006). 
In our model, the composition of the group of firms composing the consortium is incidental: at the time of 
the exchange, the cooperative firm is not aware of the nature of its interlocutors. By indicating with z the number of 
cooperative firms in the group of partners n  of the consortium, we can easily ascertain that this number is a 
hypergeometric aleatory variable with an expected value ( )E z nx= . Multiple cooperation enables cooperative firms 
to repeatedly use the potential social capital, which will therefore be multiplied by a value equal to the number of 
c
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cooperative firms present in the consortium. Indicating with i  the actual number of cooperative partners, we can 
express the cooperative firm’s expected payoff as: 
 1 2
1
( ) ( )
n
s
i
y A iK p z i
=
+ ⋅ =∑  
recalling that 1 0y =  if 0i = . 
Taking into account that the expected payoff of non-cooperative firms remains equal to 2y , we can rewrite the 
differential equations of the model in the following way: 
  1 2 2
1
(1 ) ( , ) ( )
n
s
i
x x x y A iK k p z i y
=
 = − + = −  ∑&  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) kyxizpkiKAyxsk n
i
s δ−

 −−=+= ∑
=1
221 1,&  
In order to make the analysis more manageable, let us assume that the production functions are of the Ak  type, 
precisely that 1 2( )sy A iK k= +  and 2 2y A k= . 
After some algebraic passages, the dynamic equations of the model become: 
 [ ]2(1 ) ( 0)sx x x kK nx A kp z= − − =&  
                                                     22 (1 ( 0)) sk s A k xp z kK nx kδ = − = + − &  
The model shows constant returns of capital, and is thus able to generate long-term endogenous growth. The growth 
rates are not conditioned by the hypothesis of technological consortia while the dynamics of transition are. It is 
enough to study the effects of consortia on the dynamics of cooperation to verify this. It is clear that 0x >&  if 
2 ( 0)sK nx A p z> = . Given that ( 0) 0P zx
∂ = <∂  and 
( 0) 0P z
n
∂ = <∂ , an x%  exists such that 0x >&  if x x> % and 
0x <&  when x x< % . An increase in n  (keeping x  constant) reduces the limit value x%  allowing the system to 
converge with greater probability towards cooperative equilibria.  
In practice only few cooperative firms, assuming they have the necessary institutional, legal and 
technological instruments available to create a network of relations of mutual technological and information 
exchange, can produce a significant change in the dynamics and make a decisive contribution to the spread of 
cooperation. 
The role of local institutions is essential to promote and coordinate the formation and subsequent management of 
local consortia. Interventions may take different forms, amongst which the assumption of a part of the costs of the 
creation and management of the consortium, access to particular resources granted not to individual firms but only 
to the consortium, the priority of evasions of practices concerning the consortium with respect to those relating to 
individual firms. If the local institution does not want to enter directly into the consortium, it can still promote its 
creation by facilitating communication between firms in such a way as to translate the willingness to cooperate in 
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some of them into concrete initiatives. Cooperative firms, in fact, have no way of deploying their cooperative nature 
if they do not come into contact with other cooperative firms, a contact that is unlikely if the transaction costs and 
information asymmetries are not reduced. The task of institutions is to strengthen the information network that 
makes information on the activity of local businesses accessible in good time and generates a reputational effect able 
to promote the dissemination of cooperation. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The model proposed in this work develops the fundamental elements of neoclassical growth à la Solow in a 
context of strategic interaction between firms belonging to a local network. Cooperation is able to increase the 
productivity of factors (specifically of physical capital) promoting, in the long-term, a higher rate of growth (in the 
case of constant productivity of capital) or a higher level of physical capital in a steady-state (in the case of 
diminishing productivity of capital). Cooperative strategies foster better results through the accumulation of a 
production factor that we define as social capital. In particular, the spread of cooperation allows transforming the 
social capital from a potential to an actual resource and, therefore, directly usable in the production process. 
Given the nature of the return of physical capital, the technological progress (extended to all firms) does not 
condition the dynamics of cooperation, in the sense that an economic system converging to a Pareto-dominated 
equilibrium would not alter such a tendency even following a technological improvement. It is even possible that the 
opposite occurs, that is, that an economy with increasing levels of cooperation and output experiences a reversal of 
this trend due to an increase of the productivity factor 2A .  For non-cooperative firms, since the reactivity of output 
to technological progress is higher, an increase of 2A  produces increments of higher output thus rendering the 
individualistic strategy stronger in evolutionary terms. 
These conclusions have led us to reconsider the nature of local development economic policies. We believe 
that the promotion of investment in new technology continues to be the strategy that should be followed, but we 
need to review the substance of the forms of organization of this type of investment, to be integrated with 
interventions that create the right incentives for cooperation. These concern the direct growth of potential social 
capital or the repeated use of this resource, through participation in long-term research projects, or exchange of 
technology and information within technological consortia. 
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Appendix A: Proposition 1 
 
First step: From (2) we obtain 2
1
0 0 1 yx x x x
y
 = ⇔ = ∨ = ∨ =  
& . With 2
1
yx
y
= , we define a function ( )x k  that is 
a vertical line on the point 2
1
1yx
y
= < . Moreover if 2
1
0 yx
y
< <  then 0x <& , and if 2
1
yx
y
>  then 0x >& . 
 
Second step: From (1) we obtain ( )( ){ }0100 212 =−−+∨=⇔= kyxyxskk δ& . With ( )( ) kyxyxs δ−−+ 212 1  we 
define a function ( )k x%  with 0k
x
∂ >∂
%
 if 2
12
yx
y
>  and 0k
x
∂ <∂
%
 if 2
12
yx
y
< . In fact, from the homogeneity of 
the production function ( ) 010 22112 =−


 

−+

⇒= δ
k
A
yx
k
A
yxs
k
k& .  
Using the implicit function theorem we obtain 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2222112 22110 12 kAyxkAyx kAykAxyxk k ′−−′− −−= ∂∂ =&  from which we 
define a function ( )xk~  and it is easy to show that 0k
x
∂ >∂
%
 if 2
12
yx
y
> . Moreover (0)k k= (%  and ˆ(1)k k=%  with 
ˆ 0k k> >( .  In fact with 0x =  a 0k >(  exists such that 22 0Asy k δ
  − =    and, with 1x =  a 
ˆ 0k >  exists 
such that 11 0
Asy
k
δ  − =   . Since, keeping k constant, it must be 
1 2
1 2
A Ay y
k k
   >       , as a consequence we 
have ˆ 0k k> >( . 
Furthermore, keeping x  constant, ( )k k x< % ⇒ 0k >&  and  ( )k k x> %  ⇒ 0k <& .  
 
Third step: From the linearization of the equations (1) and (2) we show the local stability of points  ( 0x = ; k k= ( ) 
and ( 1x = ; ˆk k= ), and the instability of the  point ( )( )1212 ~, yykkyyx ==  . With 0k ε= +  we have that 
( )k k x< % , from which 0k >& ; trajectories move away from the point ( ;  0x ). Given that we have not cyclic 
paths around the inner equilibrium point, using the theorem of Poincarè-Bendixson the system will converge to 
a  point that, given steps 1 and 2, will be ( )k(;0  if 2
1
yx
y
<  and ( )kˆ;0  if 2
1
yx
y
> .•  
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Appendix B:  Proposition 2. 
 
Points 1 and 2 of the Proposition derive directly from the manipulation of the formula 
( ) 01 212 =−

 −+ δ
k
y
x
k
y
xs . We therefore demonstrate only that described under point 3. The demonstration 
proceeds by steps. 
First step:  From 2 1 20 0 (1 ) 0y yk k s x x
k k
δ  = ⇔ = ∨ + − − =    
&  we conclude that 0k =&  if 2
1
1
2
yx
y
 = ± ∆   
with 11
yy
k
= , 22 yy k=  and 
1
2 2
1 4 1y
y sy
δ ∆ = − −   . 
Second step:  About point  3 ( 0∆ > ) we have three cases: 
a. 0 1< ∆ < : in this case we have i) 0 1 1< − ∆ <  and ii)1 2+ ∆ <  from which 2 0x > , 21
1
yx
y
<  and so 
1
2 1
2
0 1yx x
y
< < < < . 
b. 1∆ > : in this case we have: i) 1 0− ∆ <  and ii) 1 2+ ∆ > . From these we obtain 2 0x <  and 21
1
yx
y
> . Then, 
adding the condition 1y s
δ>  we have 1 1x < , from which 22 1
1
0 1yx x
y
< < < <  
c. 1∆ = : in this case we have: i) 01 =∆− and ii) 21 =∆+  from which 02 =x  and 
1
2
1 y
y
x = . •  
NOTE: The case 1y s
δ<  is not explicitly considered, inasmuch as it produces a general collapse of the system with 
0k <&  for each 0 1x< < .  If, in fact, 1y s
δ<  then we would have 2 0x <  and 1 1x > . 
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